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If competition is good for the private sector, as the previous article suggests, is it
also good for the public sector? Zack Cooper outlines the evidence from CEP
research on competition in healthcare – and the implications for the coalition
government’s NHS reform plans.
Competition in the public sector:
good for the goose,
good for the gander?
Can allowing hospitals to compete prompt them to
improve their clinical performance? Do hospitals facing
more competition really take steps to become more
efficient? These were the central questions that my
colleagues and I set out to answer empirically by looking
at recent NHS reforms that aimed to expand patient
choice and encourage hospital competition.
It is almost universally accepted that in the private sector,
competition is a good thing. But in public services such as
healthcare and education, introducing competition has
always been controversial. Indeed, some of the most
raucous political debates in the United States have centred
on increasing school choice, and debates over hospital
competition in the UK get equally fierce.
In our research, the goal was simple. We wanted to
sidestep the rhetoric, ignore the politics and examine
whether introducing patient choice and provider
competition into the NHS led to positive change. After
looking at millions of patient outcomes over a span of
eight years, we did indeed find that competition between
hospitals prompted the providers to raise their game. 
Our first study examined whether hospitals facing more
competition lowered their heart attack death rates more
quickly than hospitals located in monopoly markets
(Cooper et al, 2010a). We found that after competition
was introduced into the NHS in 2006, hospitals facing
greater competition decreased mortality rates about a
third of a percentage point more quickly than monopoly
providers. Considering that average mortality rates at
hospitals are about 12%, that’s a non-trivial difference –
the equivalent of approximately 300 fewer lives lost a year
from heart attacks alone. 
In a second study, we examined whether competition in
the NHS prompted hospitals to become more efficient
(Cooper et al, 2010b). We measured patients’ length of
stay in hospital for an elective hip replacement in terms of
two key components: the time from a patient’s admission
until their surgery; and the time from surgery to discharge.
While the latter component is heavily influenced by
patients’ characteristics, the former is a direct function of
a hospital’s efficiency. Our analysis showed that hospitals
facing greater competition lowered their pre-surgery
length of stay relative to monopoly providers, but they
were not significantly different on the post-surgery length
of stay. We therefore concluded that in the face of greater
competition, hospitals improved their efficiency without
discharging patients ‘sicker and quicker’.
Other CEP research illustrates the possible mechanism
through which competition may be prompting hospitals to
improve (Bloom et al, 2010). This study found that better
managed hospitals in England had better outcomes for
patients and were more cost-effective. What’s more,
greater competition actually prompted hospitals to
improve their management performance.
What does all this mean for the future provision of public
services? As in the private sector, competition in the public
sector can create meaningful incentives for providers and
better results for paitents. So policy-makers should take
steps to encourage hospitals to compete and lift the
protections that have historically been afforded to under-
performing providers, which, all too often, have allowed







outcomesBut increasing competition does not necessarily mean
reducing regulation. Particularly in healthcare markets,
where quality is difficult to measure and the asymmetry of
information between patients and professionals is
pervasive, the government still needs to play an active role
ensuring that these markets operate effectively. This
means regulating minimum standards, only allowing price
competition in certain sectors and working tirelessly to
publish and promote measures of provider performance.
How does this evidence fit with the coalition government’s
proposals for NHS reform? I firmly believe that while
giving GPs a larger role in purchasing decisions in the NHS
certainly makes sense, the government’s proposal for GP
consortia is likely to reduce competition rather than
increase it.
Strong markets require strong purchasers that have the
skills and inclination to promote competition, differentiate
between providers and seek the most productive care for
their patients, rather than simply the least expensive.
Unfortunately, this is a combination of skills that I do not
believe GPs in England have at present, and it is one that
will take the nascent GP consortia a significant amount of
time to develop.
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